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Product: Book
ISBN-10: 0-06-108686-X
ISBN-13: 9780061086861
Publisher: Harper Perennial
Country:
Year: August 1, 2005
Size: 13.49 x 20.50 x 3.51cm
Number of pages: 704
Weight: 599gr
Binding: Paperback
ISBN-10: 0-06-108686-X
ISBN-13: 9780061086861
Publisher: Harper Perennial
Country:
Year: August 1, 2005
Size: 13.49 x 20.50 x 3.51cm
Number of pages: 704
Weight: 599gr
Binding: Paperback
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Product Description
Napoleon dominated nearly all of Europe by 1810, largely succeeding in his aim to reign over the civilized world. But Britain eluded him. To conquer the island nation, he needed Russia's Tsar Alexander's help. The Tsar refused, and Napoleon vowed to teach him a lesson by intimidation and force. The ensuing invasion of Russia, during the frigid winter of 1812, would mark the beginning of the end of Napoleon's empire. Although his army captured Moscow after a brutal march deep into hostile territory, it was a hollow victory for the demoralized troops. Napoleon's men were eventually turned back, and their defeat was a momentous turning point in world affairs. Dramatic, insightful, and enormously absorbing, Moscow 1812 is a masterful work of history.
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It is with great respect that I read Zamoyski's 1812. Respect not only for its author, but also for the players in this horrifying chain of events. Zamoyski has to be praised for making history imaginable, not only on an intellectual level, but also to the senses and to our emotions. His creed 'ad fontes' has given breadth and depth of approach, without drawing me, interested layman (forgive my pun) into discussions with his peers. Two remarks aside. Sometimes the horror-tales of eyewitnesses can be deceiving for the overall picture. People tend to report about the things that go wrong, or the things that make an impression because they are repulsive or stupid. Moving an army of hundreds of thousands over thousands of kilometres in the described conditions is no mean feat. So a lot of things must have gone right. Describing cannibalism is more spectacular than describing the organisation of well-oiled logistics. Zamoyski does pay attention to this aspect, to be sure, but in order to make his account readable, he has to zoom in on the catastrophic. We would get a greatly distorted view of our modern history if we were to let our news agencies dictate it. So putting too much trust in eyewitness accounts may obscure rather than clarify our view about what is really going on. Secondly, we have to take into account that in 1812, even in normal circumstances, death was omnipresent and life in general was infinitely harder than we can imagine in our world where even our soldiers are never further than one hour away from a hamburger and a coke. By the way, I loved the asides of Zamoyski where he draws lines between those days and modern history, such as the horrors of serfdom in Russia and their meekness towards absolute rule under communism – which might even be extended to their craving for a powerful leader as Poutin
It is with great respect that I read Zamoyski's 1812. Respect not only for its author, but also for the players in this horrifying chain of events. Zamoyski has to be praised for making history imaginable, not only on an intellectual level, but also to the senses and to our emotions. His creed 'ad fontes' has given breadth and depth of approach, without drawing me, interested layman (forgive my pun) into discussions with his peers. Two remarks aside. Sometimes the horror-tales of eyewitnesses can be deceiving for the overall picture. People tend to report about the things that go wrong, or the things that make an impression because they are repulsive or stupid. Moving an army of hundreds of thousands over thousands of kilometres in the described conditions is no mean feat. So a lot of things must have gone right. Describing cannibalism is more spectacular than describing the organisation of well-oiled logistics. Zamoyski does pay attention to this aspect, to be sure, but in order to make his account readable, he has to zoom in on the catastrophic. We would get a greatly distorted view of our modern history if we were to let our news agencies dictate it. So putting too much trust in eyewitness accounts may obscure rather than clarify our view about what is really going on. Secondly, we have to take into account that in 1812, even in normal circumstances, death was omnipresent and life in general was infinitely harder than we can imagine in our world where even our soldiers are never further than one hour away from a hamburger and a coke. By the way, I loved the asides of Zamoyski where he draws lines between those days and modern history, such as the horrors of serfdom in Russia and their meekness towards absolute rule under communism – which might even be extended to their craving for a powerful leader as Poutin
Hubris Decimated
One can learn many things from »Napoleon 1812.« We realize once again, that: human behavior and human history tend to repeat themselves. Author Adam Zamoyski begins with the historical background and contemporary political climate of the prelude to Napoleon's invasion of Russia. Napoleon's France was the major European superpower, and the strongest nation in Europe diplomatically, and militarily France was financially well-off due to the Continental System of trade during this period. In the prelude to the invasion of Russia, the French mainstream media (only newspapers and flyers back then) beat a steady drum beat for war with Russia. Ubiquitous nationalism, jingoistic flag waving, and publicly showing »support« on one's sleeve. The air of optimism. As the day of departure for hundreds of thousands of troops came, nationalism increased to higher and higher levels, crescendoing into a peak of »irrational exuberance« in Paris. Sound familiar? And from Paris, the troops left on their march, marching all the way to Moscow. The fervent and boisterous French were sure of victory, and discounted any potentially negative and dire consequences of invading Russia in the days of horse and carriage. Slowly traversing the vast Russian landscape with soldiers and food supply-lines during Spring, Summer, and in the paralyzing, deadly Russian Winters. Scarce food and firewood for warmth, icy roads, semi-frozen rivers, muddy, slippery roads, and slop, for travel. CROSSING THE NIEMEN RIVER: The historical and militaristic significance of crossing the Niemen river, which is, the real entrance into Russia: After crossing the Niemen, time and time again, Napoleon's forces battled and lost their constant fight with mother nature. And, most of the casualties of the Grand Army actually occurred during the Spring and Summer due to starvation, desertion, suicide, and typhus, etc. Ill troops and high casualties depleted the ranks. In Winter, lethal temperatures, slippery roads and icy rivers, constantly bogged down this massive logistical operation. Transportation routes and local food were sparse. And all of these circumstances were in a hostile land they had invaded. In addition to organized Russian army battles, the Russian partisans and Cossacks frequently inflicted casualties and damage by hitting and running, often waiting for Grand Army stragglers to fall behind the pack. When The Grand Army reached Moscow they expected a welcome from Moscow's mayor and local leaders This was customary during those times. Conquerors and occupiers were treated like guests by the weaker, defeated nation. Instead, the Grand Army met the »Scorched Earth Strategy.« Moscow was literally burning to the ground. Criminals and the mentally ill were released from prisons to roam the streets for the occupiers to deal with. There was no livestock, therefore no food. All livestock animals had been taken out of the city. Animals not able to be evacuated, were killed so nothing of value would be left to the invaders. There was nobody there, but some of the Muscovite citizens who unable to get out of Moscow. And after this, these same hundreds of thousands of Grand Army men, would have to march all the way back to Central Europe. Fending off the attacking cossacks, starvation, disease, and fatal Winter, along they way. Instance after instance, the troops, their horses, cannons/weapons, and food supplies got stuck in the mud. Even Napoleon himself, fell and slid down icy slopes. Horses drowned in icy rivers while trying to cross them. The supply line of food became clogged as the Russian Winter set in. Lacking food and basic living supplies, soldiers fought each other over food and goods, pillaging and stealing from each other. Survival or death was at stake. Small groups would trek out on the frozen swaths of barren land to forage for food. What little they usually found was rotten. If a few soldiers found a hut to light a fire inside to escape sub-zero temperatures, other soldiers would relentlessly bombard the hut trying to enter in order to try to save their own lives. The Decimation of Napoleon's forces was slow, steady, methodical, and brutal. The Winter, Russians, and relentless Cossacks stalked the French forces as they retreated. Always waiting for a horse's bridle to break, a wagon wheel to fall off, or a group of soldiers to fall behind the pack. Once this happened, the vulnerable and out-numbered stragglers were killed, and lifted of any valuable they had. Many times throughout this book I was reminded of Hitler's decision to invade Russia (USSR) in »Operation Barbarossa.« Hitler sent his troops in Russia on September 30th, with no Winter clothes. Like Napoleon, Hitler was so optimistic that he falsely believed he'd make it to Moscow before Winter. And, nearly 120 years later, the Winter and people fought back and won. There are many astutely drawn diagrams detailing the movement of forces, and drawings and sketches on the same page as the written description. Out of 690,000 of the International Grand Army soldiers (less than 50% were French) that left for Russia, less than half ever returned. Casualties were approximately 400,000. In the beginning of this campaign, there was a lust for power and domination. In the end, there was massive defeat, tragedy, and embarrassment. This book uses historical facts, interviews, writings, and drawings by those involved. This book was well written and well researched, and very descriptive.
One can learn many things from »Napoleon 1812.« We realize once again, that: human behavior and human history tend to repeat themselves. Author Adam Zamoyski begins with the historical background and contemporary political climate of the prelude to Napoleon's invasion of Russia. Napoleon's France was the major European superpower, and the strongest nation in Europe diplomatically, and militarily France was financially well-off due to the Continental System of trade during this period. In the prelude to the invasion of Russia, the French mainstream media (only newspapers and flyers back then) beat a steady drum beat for war with Russia. Ubiquitous nationalism, jingoistic flag waving, and publicly showing »support« on one's sleeve. The air of optimism. As the day of departure for hundreds of thousands of troops came, nationalism increased to higher and higher levels, crescendoing into a peak of »irrational exuberance« in Paris. Sound familiar? And from Paris, the troops left on their march, marching all the way to Moscow. The fervent and boisterous French were sure of victory, and discounted any potentially negative and dire consequences of invading Russia in the days of horse and carriage. Slowly traversing the vast Russian landscape with soldiers and food supply-lines during Spring, Summer, and in the paralyzing, deadly Russian Winters. Scarce food and firewood for warmth, icy roads, semi-frozen rivers, muddy, slippery roads, and slop, for travel. CROSSING THE NIEMEN RIVER: The historical and militaristic significance of crossing the Niemen river, which is, the real entrance into Russia: After crossing the Niemen, time and time again, Napoleon's forces battled and lost their constant fight with mother nature. And, most of the casualties of the Grand Army actually occurred during the Spring and Summer due to starvation, desertion, suicide, and typhus, etc. Ill troops and high casualties depleted the ranks. In Winter, lethal temperatures, slippery roads and icy rivers, constantly bogged down this massive logistical operation. Transportation routes and local food were sparse. And all of these circumstances were in a hostile land they had invaded. In addition to organized Russian army battles, the Russian partisans and Cossacks frequently inflicted casualties and damage by hitting and running, often waiting for Grand Army stragglers to fall behind the pack. When The Grand Army reached Moscow they expected a welcome from Moscow's mayor and local leaders This was customary during those times. Conquerors and occupiers were treated like guests by the weaker, defeated nation. Instead, the Grand Army met the »Scorched Earth Strategy.« Moscow was literally burning to the ground. Criminals and the mentally ill were released from prisons to roam the streets for the occupiers to deal with. There was no livestock, therefore no food. All livestock animals had been taken out of the city. Animals not able to be evacuated, were killed so nothing of value would be left to the invaders. There was nobody there, but some of the Muscovite citizens who unable to get out of Moscow. And after this, these same hundreds of thousands of Grand Army men, would have to march all the way back to Central Europe. Fending off the attacking cossacks, starvation, disease, and fatal Winter, along they way. Instance after instance, the troops, their horses, cannons/weapons, and food supplies got stuck in the mud. Even Napoleon himself, fell and slid down icy slopes. Horses drowned in icy rivers while trying to cross them. The supply line of food became clogged as the Russian Winter set in. Lacking food and basic living supplies, soldiers fought each other over food and goods, pillaging and stealing from each other. Survival or death was at stake. Small groups would trek out on the frozen swaths of barren land to forage for food. What little they usually found was rotten. If a few soldiers found a hut to light a fire inside to escape sub-zero temperatures, other soldiers would relentlessly bombard the hut trying to enter in order to try to save their own lives. The Decimation of Napoleon's forces was slow, steady, methodical, and brutal. The Winter, Russians, and relentless Cossacks stalked the French forces as they retreated. Always waiting for a horse's bridle to break, a wagon wheel to fall off, or a group of soldiers to fall behind the pack. Once this happened, the vulnerable and out-numbered stragglers were killed, and lifted of any valuable they had. Many times throughout this book I was reminded of Hitler's decision to invade Russia (USSR) in »Operation Barbarossa.« Hitler sent his troops in Russia on September 30th, with no Winter clothes. Like Napoleon, Hitler was so optimistic that he falsely believed he'd make it to Moscow before Winter. And, nearly 120 years later, the Winter and people fought back and won. There are many astutely drawn diagrams detailing the movement of forces, and drawings and sketches on the same page as the written description. Out of 690,000 of the International Grand Army soldiers (less than 50% were French) that left for Russia, less than half ever returned. Casualties were approximately 400,000. In the beginning of this campaign, there was a lust for power and domination. In the end, there was massive defeat, tragedy, and embarrassment. This book uses historical facts, interviews, writings, and drawings by those involved. This book was well written and well researched, and very descriptive.
Awesome
Books by british educated authors are usually boring. I thought I would take a chance since Zamoyski was born in New York. It paid off. I found it very exciting and easy to read. It is very detailed and thoroughly researched, yet not boring at all. I couldn't put it down, and I wanted more. It reads like a novel, and keeps you hooked. I have started reading his other book about the fall of Napoleon. I would love to see Zamoyski write some more about Napoleon's earlier campaigns.
Books by british educated authors are usually boring. I thought I would take a chance since Zamoyski was born in New York. It paid off. I found it very exciting and easy to read. It is very detailed and thoroughly researched, yet not boring at all. I couldn't put it down, and I wanted more. It reads like a novel, and keeps you hooked. I have started reading his other book about the fall of Napoleon. I would love to see Zamoyski write some more about Napoleon's earlier campaigns.
Strongly Recommended 
Zamoyski has written a very readable account of Napoleon's invasion of Russia. Some of the reviews below suggest the nationalistic arguments that seem to break out whenever this campaign is discussed (too much about Poland, not enough about Russia's heroic role and so on). It is to Zamoyski's credit that he describes the changing historical view of the campaign both as it happened and afterwards. As has been the case in the times that Russia has entered into the heart of Europe in 1805-14, 1848, and 1945, its role has not exactly been beneficial to modern ideas of freedom and good-governance, so it is hard to put an enduring gloss on when it all started in the 1812 campaign. Kutozov's unwillingness to engage the enemy unless absolutely forced to is either a stroke of genius or poor generalship, depending on your point of view. Zamoyski shows that the Tsar felt Kutozov squandered his command and yet had to admit that the result was satisfactory, but could have been so much better (Napoleon captured). This was a feeling shared by most of the Russian generals involved. I think his narrative of the campaign is first-rate showing a good approach to dealing with the campaign. It is always difficult to get the right balance between military jargon and straightforward narration. Zamoyski is not a military historian but this is not really a weakness as Napoleon's defeat was really all of his own making and due to the appalling (although typical) winter weather, something he and most of his generals completely underestimated. His account of the bloody battle at Borodino is quite satisfactory, largely due to his straightforward style. An excellent feature of this book is the way he stresses the multinational nature of the Grande Armée (so often labeled »the French« in many accounts) and also demonstrates too the superior fighting and battlefield skills of the Armée in almost every engagement (Borodino perhaps excepted). I think the last chapter was an excellent summary of the end of the Napoleonic era, and the way that the high hopes of many in the Tsarist armies were crushed by the pig-headed Tsarist regime that ultimately crushed the populace and in time produced an even-more appalling reaction in the Bolshevik revolution. My criticism, such as it is, is that the book is not very clear as to why Napoleon took the fateful step. Perhaps it is rather difficult to understand why Napoleon did decide to invade Russia. Maybe, as the author says, Napoleon just was not thinking very clearly. It is interesting to wonder what would have happened if Napoleon had stayed in Moscow for the winter, or even if he had not invaded at all. Presumably war would have happened eventually anyway, but who knows what might have happened in the meantime and at least he would have had 600,000 or so more men to fight his battles? My reaction to reading this book is to add more of Zamoyski's books to my wish list.
Zamoyski has written a very readable account of Napoleon's invasion of Russia. Some of the reviews below suggest the nationalistic arguments that seem to break out whenever this campaign is discussed (too much about Poland, not enough about Russia's heroic role and so on). It is to Zamoyski's credit that he describes the changing historical view of the campaign both as it happened and afterwards. As has been the case in the times that Russia has entered into the heart of Europe in 1805-14, 1848, and 1945, its role has not exactly been beneficial to modern ideas of freedom and good-governance, so it is hard to put an enduring gloss on when it all started in the 1812 campaign. Kutozov's unwillingness to engage the enemy unless absolutely forced to is either a stroke of genius or poor generalship, depending on your point of view. Zamoyski shows that the Tsar felt Kutozov squandered his command and yet had to admit that the result was satisfactory, but could have been so much better (Napoleon captured). This was a feeling shared by most of the Russian generals involved. I think his narrative of the campaign is first-rate showing a good approach to dealing with the campaign. It is always difficult to get the right balance between military jargon and straightforward narration. Zamoyski is not a military historian but this is not really a weakness as Napoleon's defeat was really all of his own making and due to the appalling (although typical) winter weather, something he and most of his generals completely underestimated. His account of the bloody battle at Borodino is quite satisfactory, largely due to his straightforward style. An excellent feature of this book is the way he stresses the multinational nature of the Grande Armée (so often labeled »the French« in many accounts) and also demonstrates too the superior fighting and battlefield skills of the Armée in almost every engagement (Borodino perhaps excepted). I think the last chapter was an excellent summary of the end of the Napoleonic era, and the way that the high hopes of many in the Tsarist armies were crushed by the pig-headed Tsarist regime that ultimately crushed the populace and in time produced an even-more appalling reaction in the Bolshevik revolution. My criticism, such as it is, is that the book is not very clear as to why Napoleon took the fateful step. Perhaps it is rather difficult to understand why Napoleon did decide to invade Russia. Maybe, as the author says, Napoleon just was not thinking very clearly. It is interesting to wonder what would have happened if Napoleon had stayed in Moscow for the winter, or even if he had not invaded at all. Presumably war would have happened eventually anyway, but who knows what might have happened in the meantime and at least he would have had 600,000 or so more men to fight his battles? My reaction to reading this book is to add more of Zamoyski's books to my wish list.
Dress for Success: the Downside of Hubris
I spent some cold winters in Ohio as a small boy and later on, in Chicago as a working stiff. But I appear to have had it easy compared to those participating in the French »retreat« from Moscow. Four hundred thousand died in the West, possibly as many in the East, and for what reason? A spat between Napoleon and Alexander? A lack of communication technology? Or, more likely, personal vanity. Orwell's short story »Shooting An Elephant« comes to mind, a narrator who acts not out of personal conviction but because of poltical pressure or worse yet, vanity and shame. Moscow 1812 is history from the ground up, a terrifying story of man's inhumanity to man. Make this book required reading for the War and State departments. Put a »Billy Goat« bookcover on it and have someone read it to Bush. The world needs to wake up to the danger of false patriotism and fear-mongering. Zamoyski's book is chilling, and great. Read it, NOW!
I spent some cold winters in Ohio as a small boy and later on, in Chicago as a working stiff. But I appear to have had it easy compared to those participating in the French »retreat« from Moscow. Four hundred thousand died in the West, possibly as many in the East, and for what reason? A spat between Napoleon and Alexander? A lack of communication technology? Or, more likely, personal vanity. Orwell's short story »Shooting An Elephant« comes to mind, a narrator who acts not out of personal conviction but because of poltical pressure or worse yet, vanity and shame. Moscow 1812 is history from the ground up, a terrifying story of man's inhumanity to man. Make this book required reading for the War and State departments. Put a »Billy Goat« bookcover on it and have someone read it to Bush. The world needs to wake up to the danger of false patriotism and fear-mongering. Zamoyski's book is chilling, and great. Read it, NOW!
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