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Product: Book
ISBN-10: 0-520-21474-9
ISBN-13: 9780520214743
Publisher: University of California Press
Country:
Year: July 31, 1998
Edition: 1
Size: 15.19 x 22.61 x 3.20cm
Number of pages: 416
Weight: 599gr
Binding: Paperback
ISBN-10: 0-520-21474-9
ISBN-13: 9780520214743
Publisher: University of California Press
Country:
Year: July 31, 1998
Edition: 1
Size: 15.19 x 22.61 x 3.20cm
Number of pages: 416
Weight: 599gr
Binding: Paperback
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Andre Gunder Frank
University of California Press; 1998
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Frank explains the Rise of the West from 1400 forward in world economic and demographic terms, with a sweeping historical perspective that places it in clear conjunction with the Decline of the East around 1800. Anyone interested in Asia, in world systems and world economic and social history, in international relations, and in comparative area studies will have to take into account Frank's exciting reassessment of our global economic past and future.
Frank explains the Rise of the West from 1400 forward in world economic and demographic terms, with a sweeping historical perspective that places it in clear conjunction with the Decline of the East around 1800. Anyone interested in Asia, in world systems and world economic and social history, in international relations, and in comparative area studies will have to take into account Frank's exciting reassessment of our global economic past and future.
reviews
How Asia Once Won (And Could Again) 
Andre Gunder Frank wrote ReOrient to demonstrate that the present Western predominance in the world economy is fairly new. It began when Europe gained control of the New World's natural resources, particularly silver, and used it to »buy a ticket on the Asian train« (Gunder Frank's apt metaphor).
Andre Gunder Frank wrote ReOrient to demonstrate that the present Western predominance in the world economy is fairly new. It began when Europe gained control of the New World's natural resources, particularly silver, and used it to »buy a ticket on the Asian train« (Gunder Frank's apt metaphor).
Gunder Frank also speculates that East Asia's present economic growth and potential will eventually help it regain economic hegemony in the not too distant future.
A New Frame in Which to View World History 
I confess. I was Eurocentric. Despite a degree in International Economics from an east coast school known for its School of Foreign Service, I firmly believed Max Weber that the Protestant work-ethic was the source of western prosperity. I also believed in American exceptionalism. Frank's book cured me of both those false notions.
I confess. I was Eurocentric. Despite a degree in International Economics from an east coast school known for its School of Foreign Service, I firmly believed Max Weber that the Protestant work-ethic was the source of western prosperity. I also believed in American exceptionalism. Frank's book cured me of both those false notions.
A couple points I'd like to add to Frank's thesis explained in other reviews.
1) I work for one of the major trans-Pacific ocean shipping companies. The company was founded in California in 1848 and sold to the Singapore government in 1997. (Shipping going East)
2) US-bound shipments are full of manufactured goods. Asia-bound ships are filled with wastepaper or are largely empty. The West continues to produce nothing that Asia really wants. Where in times past, most of the Asian-bound shipments from England and the Netherlands were boats filled with silver and gold, today we »ship silver« to Asia in the form of electronic fund transfers. Given the trade deficit the US alone has with China and the rest of Asia, it seems only a matter of time before the Chinese start buying Manhattan and US assets the way the Japanese did in the 1980s.
3) Frank's book adds an interesting background to the history of the Roman Empire. After subjugating Europe, Rome moved eastward under Constantine the Great. First, Constantinople provided a more defensible position for the New Rome (indeed where the western capital – Rome –- fell in the 5th century, the eastern capital – Constantinople –- continued until the 15th century, despite being »on the way« as it were for invading Huns and other invading armies). But perhaps more importantly, all the commercial action was centered in the East. Moving the capital eastward took it out of the backwater of Italy and moved it closer to the overland trade routes with the Asia).
4)That the East was far wealthier than the West can again be seen in microcosmic perspective during the 4th Crusade. Western soldiers had never imagined a city as wealthy as Constantinople. When they saw it they had to have it. The West, especially Venice, did to Constantinople in 1205 as the British did to Bengal in 1857 and the Americans have been doing to the Native Americans since they got here. They took by force, not by superior ethic, religion, tradition, or racial superiority.
The book itself, despite its »must read status« and historical importance, is very poorly written and highly repetitious. If you read the concluding few pages, you will have the main points of the argument. Read the rest of the book if you want the details. And Frank provides plenty of detail, footnotes, references, etc.
All in all, this book is important for understanding the world's past as well as the contours of the future. I wonder how long it will take for the pendulum to swing back to Asia. Chinese-US relations are getting interesting, aren't they?
Fascinating, albeit incomplete
ReOrient is one the most important works of the last decade in that it not only challenges a dominant perspective in Western social science but it also refutes author's and his colleagues' earlier arguments. Andre Gunder Frank lays down two central arguments in ReOrient which complement one another: 1) the »rise of the West« did not happen due to any internal factors but was predicated on American silver and Asian market; 2) Asia in general and China in particular was the center of global economy until the 19th century. Thus, Frank aims to destroy the bases of Eurocentrism in social sciences. Frank argues that Europe was not an important figure in world economy until the 19th century. Asians were more productive and competitive than Europeans and Asia remained at the center of global economy until the industrial revolution. Throughout this period European nations constantly had trade deficits with Asian nations, particularly with China and India. An indication of this European trade deficit was that gold and silver were never less than two-thirds of total European exports (p. 74). New World silver was for this reason very important for the Europeans; it helped them cover their trade deficits with the Asians and become a more active player in Asian economy. Thus, Frank contends that American silver bought Europeans a ticket in the »Asian productive and commercial train, which was steaming ahead on an already well-established track,« (p. 115). One of Frank's original arguments regarding the superiority of the Chinese economy vis-à-vis the European economy in the 15th to 19th century is the different effects on these economies of the influx of New World silver. To make his case, Frank utilizes Fisher's famous quantity-price equation which maintains that an increase in the amount of money in an economy will result in increases in the prices of goods unless it is matched by an increase in quantity of goods (p. 154). Frank then demonstrates that whereas American silver caused substantial increases in the price of goods in Europe, it did not have any remarkable inflationary effect on the Chinese economy. For this to happen, Chinese production must have increased parallel to the increase in the amount of silver. This means that the massive arrival of new American money stimulated production more in Asia than in Europe (pp. 157-8). According to Frank, this situation attests to higher productivity of Chinese economy compared to European economy. Thus, Frank refutes the orthodox Eurocentric »hoarding« argument on China which assumed that the Chinese used American/European silver by and large in non-economic and unproductive ways, primarily as jewelry: »Asians earned this money first because they were more industrious and more productive to begin with; the additional money then generated still more Asian demand and production,« (p. 177). Another historical fact Frank uses to demonstrate the superiority of Asian economies over European economies is the per capita production in these two economies in the 16th to 19th century. Using the estimates of such prominent historians as Braudel and Bairoch, Frank shows that in 1750 Asians accounted for 66 percent of world population but produced 80 percent of total world output; by contrast, Europe, which constituted 20 percent of world population then, produced only part of the remaining 20 percent. This again means that on average »Asians must have been significantly more productive than Europeans in 1750" (p. 173). As in the fist case, Franks' reasoning is simple, but smart and convincing. After all these economic comparisons, Frank concludes that the Europeans did not «create» the world economic system but «purchased» an existing one with American silver. He therefore asserts that «the rise of the West» must be derived from the prior and contemporaneous development of «The rest,» (p. 224). Prospects: The principal importance of ReOrient lies in its demolishing the bases of Eurocentrism in theories that explain «the rise of West» with factors that are internal to Europe. These theories attributed European economic development to Europe's exceptionality in such factors as rationality, religion, science, and geographic location. Yet Frank demonstrates that Europe did not have any inherent superiority in the 15th through 18th century vis-à-vis Asia and Asian nations were at least as much rational, industrial, capitalist, and dynamic as the European ones. Thus, there was no European «head start» or «exceptionality» that would necessitate the creation of a European hegemony over others. It was American silver and Asian market that allowed the «rise of the West». As such, Frank's arguments change the central question to be dealt with regarding the rise of the West. The critical question is no more why it was the West that rose in the 15th century -because it did not-, but why and how the West rose in the late 18th and early 19th century. As Frank argues, the new question is not about a mere difference in time but begs a qualitatively different answer. What makes ReOrient particularly important is that it not only destroys the myth of «European exceptionalism» but it also uncovers and refutes the Eurocentrism in the critics of these theories as well. Frank argues that such important critics of capitalist world economy as Marx, Braudel, and Wallerstein could not escape the Eurocentrism embedded in the theories they criticized either. While Marx viewed Asian nations as stagnant, traditional and inferior; Wallerstein assigned an insignificant role to Asia and the Mediterranean in the making of his modern world-system (p. 45). Frank views these arguments as mere assumptions and refutes them in two ways: first, he tries to demonstrate that Europe did not have any inherent superiority in the 15th through 18th century vis-à-vis Asia; second, Frank argues that Europe owe its future «rise» to its borrowing from and integration to a well-established Asian economy. Thus, Frank demonstrates that Europe did not create a world system and incorporated more and more of the rest of the world as Wallerstein argued, but rather integrated itself to the Asian market and «climbed up on the back of Asia,» (pp. 4, 30) Problems: Unfortunately, Frank's novel theorizing turns out to be at the expense of some conceptual clarity. Frank's approach to world economy and modes of production renders such important concepts like world system and capitalism ambiguous. Frank argues that there has always been «one world economy/system» and it had its «own structure and dynamic,» (p. 139). In Frank's view, existence of any trade relations between regions of the world create a world system. Thus, Frank equates global trade with world system. However, until the 18th century trade was highly regionalized and most regions had miniscule contacts with others. Frank himself notes that Europeans' role in Asian trade before the second half of the 18th century was insignificant and Europe accounted for only one percent of Asian nations' international trade (pp. 178-85). Thus, if we define world-system as a global economic system in which most parts of the world are economically dependent on one another, I will have to side with Wallerstein who argued that such a system did not exist until the 19th century («The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System», in The Essential Wallerstein, p. 74). Indeed, although unintentionally, Frank also provide support to this point when he notes that Europeans were the first to «operate in all markets simultaneously or systematically to integrate its activities between all of them,» (p. 177). As such, there has been only one world-system so far and -unfortunately- it has been a European one. A subsequent problem that results from Frank's bias towards holistic analysis is his search for single centers in world economy. Frank argues that the entire world economy was «Sinocentric» until the 19th century (p. 117). However, I have doubts regarding China's central role in economies of European and Middle Eastern countries in any period of history. Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries the Ottomans and Persians were more central to Middle Eastern economies than were the Chinese. Similarly, in the same period the British and the Dutch were more central to European economy than the Chinese. I therefore tend to agree with Pomeranz who later stated that the pre-1800 world was «a polycentric world with no dominant center,» (The Great Divergence, p. 4). Another shortcoming in Frank's book is that he cannot adequately account for the «rise of the West» in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. His argument is that Asian economies were altogether facing a Kondratieff B-cycle in the first half of the 18th century and this allowed Europe to finally outdo the Asians. He therefore asserts that «the fall of Asia» preceded European political and military intervention in Asian nations (pp. 266-8). The first problem one might have with this argument is that it is impressionistic and allows little room to human agency. A more fundamental problem that I have, however, is that Frank's account does not consider the possibility that the Asian economic decline in the first half of the 18th century could have been a temporary problem and Asian economies could have easily recovered if it were not for European military intervention. Indeed, Frank himself reports that average annual exports from Asia by both Dutch and British East India companies declined in the decades of 1730s and 1740s «but recovered in the 1750s,» (p. 270). Frank also notes that throughout the 18th century the balance of trade between Britain and China was constantly in China's favor and the British could reverse this situation only through forced opium trade in the 19th century. Thus, contra Frank, I believe that Asian economic problems in the 18th century were not insurmountable and «the fall of Asia" was indeed a European creation. As such, we still do not have a satisfying answer as to why Europe outdid the Asians by 1800.
ReOrient is one the most important works of the last decade in that it not only challenges a dominant perspective in Western social science but it also refutes author's and his colleagues' earlier arguments. Andre Gunder Frank lays down two central arguments in ReOrient which complement one another: 1) the »rise of the West« did not happen due to any internal factors but was predicated on American silver and Asian market; 2) Asia in general and China in particular was the center of global economy until the 19th century. Thus, Frank aims to destroy the bases of Eurocentrism in social sciences. Frank argues that Europe was not an important figure in world economy until the 19th century. Asians were more productive and competitive than Europeans and Asia remained at the center of global economy until the industrial revolution. Throughout this period European nations constantly had trade deficits with Asian nations, particularly with China and India. An indication of this European trade deficit was that gold and silver were never less than two-thirds of total European exports (p. 74). New World silver was for this reason very important for the Europeans; it helped them cover their trade deficits with the Asians and become a more active player in Asian economy. Thus, Frank contends that American silver bought Europeans a ticket in the »Asian productive and commercial train, which was steaming ahead on an already well-established track,« (p. 115). One of Frank's original arguments regarding the superiority of the Chinese economy vis-à-vis the European economy in the 15th to 19th century is the different effects on these economies of the influx of New World silver. To make his case, Frank utilizes Fisher's famous quantity-price equation which maintains that an increase in the amount of money in an economy will result in increases in the prices of goods unless it is matched by an increase in quantity of goods (p. 154). Frank then demonstrates that whereas American silver caused substantial increases in the price of goods in Europe, it did not have any remarkable inflationary effect on the Chinese economy. For this to happen, Chinese production must have increased parallel to the increase in the amount of silver. This means that the massive arrival of new American money stimulated production more in Asia than in Europe (pp. 157-8). According to Frank, this situation attests to higher productivity of Chinese economy compared to European economy. Thus, Frank refutes the orthodox Eurocentric »hoarding« argument on China which assumed that the Chinese used American/European silver by and large in non-economic and unproductive ways, primarily as jewelry: »Asians earned this money first because they were more industrious and more productive to begin with; the additional money then generated still more Asian demand and production,« (p. 177). Another historical fact Frank uses to demonstrate the superiority of Asian economies over European economies is the per capita production in these two economies in the 16th to 19th century. Using the estimates of such prominent historians as Braudel and Bairoch, Frank shows that in 1750 Asians accounted for 66 percent of world population but produced 80 percent of total world output; by contrast, Europe, which constituted 20 percent of world population then, produced only part of the remaining 20 percent. This again means that on average »Asians must have been significantly more productive than Europeans in 1750" (p. 173). As in the fist case, Franks' reasoning is simple, but smart and convincing. After all these economic comparisons, Frank concludes that the Europeans did not «create» the world economic system but «purchased» an existing one with American silver. He therefore asserts that «the rise of the West» must be derived from the prior and contemporaneous development of «The rest,» (p. 224). Prospects: The principal importance of ReOrient lies in its demolishing the bases of Eurocentrism in theories that explain «the rise of West» with factors that are internal to Europe. These theories attributed European economic development to Europe's exceptionality in such factors as rationality, religion, science, and geographic location. Yet Frank demonstrates that Europe did not have any inherent superiority in the 15th through 18th century vis-à-vis Asia and Asian nations were at least as much rational, industrial, capitalist, and dynamic as the European ones. Thus, there was no European «head start» or «exceptionality» that would necessitate the creation of a European hegemony over others. It was American silver and Asian market that allowed the «rise of the West». As such, Frank's arguments change the central question to be dealt with regarding the rise of the West. The critical question is no more why it was the West that rose in the 15th century -because it did not-, but why and how the West rose in the late 18th and early 19th century. As Frank argues, the new question is not about a mere difference in time but begs a qualitatively different answer. What makes ReOrient particularly important is that it not only destroys the myth of «European exceptionalism» but it also uncovers and refutes the Eurocentrism in the critics of these theories as well. Frank argues that such important critics of capitalist world economy as Marx, Braudel, and Wallerstein could not escape the Eurocentrism embedded in the theories they criticized either. While Marx viewed Asian nations as stagnant, traditional and inferior; Wallerstein assigned an insignificant role to Asia and the Mediterranean in the making of his modern world-system (p. 45). Frank views these arguments as mere assumptions and refutes them in two ways: first, he tries to demonstrate that Europe did not have any inherent superiority in the 15th through 18th century vis-à-vis Asia; second, Frank argues that Europe owe its future «rise» to its borrowing from and integration to a well-established Asian economy. Thus, Frank demonstrates that Europe did not create a world system and incorporated more and more of the rest of the world as Wallerstein argued, but rather integrated itself to the Asian market and «climbed up on the back of Asia,» (pp. 4, 30) Problems: Unfortunately, Frank's novel theorizing turns out to be at the expense of some conceptual clarity. Frank's approach to world economy and modes of production renders such important concepts like world system and capitalism ambiguous. Frank argues that there has always been «one world economy/system» and it had its «own structure and dynamic,» (p. 139). In Frank's view, existence of any trade relations between regions of the world create a world system. Thus, Frank equates global trade with world system. However, until the 18th century trade was highly regionalized and most regions had miniscule contacts with others. Frank himself notes that Europeans' role in Asian trade before the second half of the 18th century was insignificant and Europe accounted for only one percent of Asian nations' international trade (pp. 178-85). Thus, if we define world-system as a global economic system in which most parts of the world are economically dependent on one another, I will have to side with Wallerstein who argued that such a system did not exist until the 19th century («The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System», in The Essential Wallerstein, p. 74). Indeed, although unintentionally, Frank also provide support to this point when he notes that Europeans were the first to «operate in all markets simultaneously or systematically to integrate its activities between all of them,» (p. 177). As such, there has been only one world-system so far and -unfortunately- it has been a European one. A subsequent problem that results from Frank's bias towards holistic analysis is his search for single centers in world economy. Frank argues that the entire world economy was «Sinocentric» until the 19th century (p. 117). However, I have doubts regarding China's central role in economies of European and Middle Eastern countries in any period of history. Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries the Ottomans and Persians were more central to Middle Eastern economies than were the Chinese. Similarly, in the same period the British and the Dutch were more central to European economy than the Chinese. I therefore tend to agree with Pomeranz who later stated that the pre-1800 world was «a polycentric world with no dominant center,» (The Great Divergence, p. 4). Another shortcoming in Frank's book is that he cannot adequately account for the «rise of the West» in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. His argument is that Asian economies were altogether facing a Kondratieff B-cycle in the first half of the 18th century and this allowed Europe to finally outdo the Asians. He therefore asserts that «the fall of Asia» preceded European political and military intervention in Asian nations (pp. 266-8). The first problem one might have with this argument is that it is impressionistic and allows little room to human agency. A more fundamental problem that I have, however, is that Frank's account does not consider the possibility that the Asian economic decline in the first half of the 18th century could have been a temporary problem and Asian economies could have easily recovered if it were not for European military intervention. Indeed, Frank himself reports that average annual exports from Asia by both Dutch and British East India companies declined in the decades of 1730s and 1740s «but recovered in the 1750s,» (p. 270). Frank also notes that throughout the 18th century the balance of trade between Britain and China was constantly in China's favor and the British could reverse this situation only through forced opium trade in the 19th century. Thus, contra Frank, I believe that Asian economic problems in the 18th century were not insurmountable and «the fall of Asia" was indeed a European creation. As such, we still do not have a satisfying answer as to why Europe outdid the Asians by 1800.
I' d rather read other books 
After reading Mr. Albin's excellent review, I will only add that, instead of »Reorient«, on the vexing question of why Western countries have dominated the world during the last few centuries [the very way the question is posed is controversial!], I would suggest reading the following books: 1) »Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium« by Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O'Rourke; 2)»The Great Divergence«, by Kennetz Pomeranz (far clearer than »Reorient); 3 – 4): «The world economy. A millennial perspective» (2001) plus «The world economy: Historical Statistics» (2003) by Angus Maddison (a combined edition of these two volumes appeared on December 2007); 5) The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation by John M. Hobson, and 6) it also seems interesting the brief book to be published this June «Why Europe? The Rise of the West in World History 1500-1850" by Jack A. Goldstone. And for those looking for a broad framework to understand the past, I would add the following works, whose scope is amazingly global: 1. Agrarian cultures: »Pre-industrial societies« by Patricia Crone; 2. Government: »The History of Government« by S.E. Finer; 3. Ideas: »Ideas, a History from Fire to Freud«, by Peter Watson; 4. Religion: »The Phenomenon of Religion: A Thematic Approach« by Moojan Momen; and 5. War: »War in Human Civilization« by Azar Gat.
After reading Mr. Albin's excellent review, I will only add that, instead of »Reorient«, on the vexing question of why Western countries have dominated the world during the last few centuries [the very way the question is posed is controversial!], I would suggest reading the following books: 1) »Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium« by Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O'Rourke; 2)»The Great Divergence«, by Kennetz Pomeranz (far clearer than »Reorient); 3 – 4): «The world economy. A millennial perspective» (2001) plus «The world economy: Historical Statistics» (2003) by Angus Maddison (a combined edition of these two volumes appeared on December 2007); 5) The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation by John M. Hobson, and 6) it also seems interesting the brief book to be published this June «Why Europe? The Rise of the West in World History 1500-1850" by Jack A. Goldstone. And for those looking for a broad framework to understand the past, I would add the following works, whose scope is amazingly global: 1. Agrarian cultures: »Pre-industrial societies« by Patricia Crone; 2. Government: »The History of Government« by S.E. Finer; 3. Ideas: »Ideas, a History from Fire to Freud«, by Peter Watson; 4. Religion: »The Phenomenon of Religion: A Thematic Approach« by Moojan Momen; and 5. War: »War in Human Civilization« by Azar Gat.
Andre Gunder Frank's Magnum Opus
»ReORIENT« is a fairly silly title perhaps, but behind this lurks German economic historian André Gunder Frank's magnum opus, the last major (re)statement of his refutation of Eurocentrism in his field and the rehabilitation of Asian wealth and development historically (Frank unfortunately died a few years ago). Written in an now and then dry but usually lively manner, Frank's book veers between the purely analytical and cautious and the passionate and polemical. This combination gives otherwise possibly dull matter a tempo and tension that should make it well worth reading for more than just specialists. Frank's main thesis is the by now increasingly, if still far insufficiently, acknowledged fact that Europe was ahead neither in technological development nor in wealth nor in military power in the days of the Columbian conquests of the Americas. Contrary to this popular belief, Europe was in fact for the most part behind in all these factors until roughly 1750-1800. Frank establishes this thesis, which he shares with other major writers against Eurocentrism such as James Blaut, Jack Goody, Eric Wolf and so forth, with much statistical support and excellence and a strong sense of indignation, carrying the reader along through thorough analysis of Asian trading patterns, reports of Portuguese sailors, methodological discussions and much more. In this, Frank not only argues against the received opinion, still taught in practically every high school history class, that Europe was dominant in the world from the Middle Ages on (if not earlier), but also against colleagues in heterodoxy whom he accuses of still ceding too much ground to a Eurocentric, Euro-endogenous view of the origin of the Industrial Revolution, among whom are giants like Wallerstein and Braudel. Overall, the book is very closely and strongly argued and it will be hard to find fault with any of the analysis if one has an open mind and is willing to have received opinions changed by the facts. Nonetheless, some criticisms can be made. The first is that Frank has a tendency to go off on tangents and has trouble keeping the structure of the book together, leading to oddities such as an almost impassably long chapter on mostly Chinese coinage, which detracts from the flow of the argument. The second is that where he correctly attacks the Eurocentric mistakes made by the usually also very heterodox ideas in these fields of Marx and his supporters, he goes overboard in this in wanting to reject the idea of 'capitalism' and 'feudalism' altogether, which is not helpful, and leads himself to remove all useful analysis of production and classes from his historical overview. This in turn leads to the major error in his approach, which is the excessive focus on trade, particularly foreign trade, as vehicle for historical change. The third is that Frank seems to want to put much stock instead into the independent power of cyclical phenomena in economics such as the Kondratieff cycle; surely an interesting phenomenon but not one that can be taken as causative on its own without losing the scientific method in political economy altogether. The fourth is the focus on Asia, which comes almost entirely at the expense of focus on Africa, and to a lesser degree the Americas. Nonetheless, this book also contains all that is the best of André Gunder Frank, such as his immense knowledge, his courage in rejecting and questioning received opinion, his effectiveness in refuting Eurocentrism, and his strong ability to make much use of what is often little or confused historical-statistical information. For these reasons, this book is a masterpiece that belongs in any intellectual library.
»ReORIENT« is a fairly silly title perhaps, but behind this lurks German economic historian André Gunder Frank's magnum opus, the last major (re)statement of his refutation of Eurocentrism in his field and the rehabilitation of Asian wealth and development historically (Frank unfortunately died a few years ago). Written in an now and then dry but usually lively manner, Frank's book veers between the purely analytical and cautious and the passionate and polemical. This combination gives otherwise possibly dull matter a tempo and tension that should make it well worth reading for more than just specialists. Frank's main thesis is the by now increasingly, if still far insufficiently, acknowledged fact that Europe was ahead neither in technological development nor in wealth nor in military power in the days of the Columbian conquests of the Americas. Contrary to this popular belief, Europe was in fact for the most part behind in all these factors until roughly 1750-1800. Frank establishes this thesis, which he shares with other major writers against Eurocentrism such as James Blaut, Jack Goody, Eric Wolf and so forth, with much statistical support and excellence and a strong sense of indignation, carrying the reader along through thorough analysis of Asian trading patterns, reports of Portuguese sailors, methodological discussions and much more. In this, Frank not only argues against the received opinion, still taught in practically every high school history class, that Europe was dominant in the world from the Middle Ages on (if not earlier), but also against colleagues in heterodoxy whom he accuses of still ceding too much ground to a Eurocentric, Euro-endogenous view of the origin of the Industrial Revolution, among whom are giants like Wallerstein and Braudel. Overall, the book is very closely and strongly argued and it will be hard to find fault with any of the analysis if one has an open mind and is willing to have received opinions changed by the facts. Nonetheless, some criticisms can be made. The first is that Frank has a tendency to go off on tangents and has trouble keeping the structure of the book together, leading to oddities such as an almost impassably long chapter on mostly Chinese coinage, which detracts from the flow of the argument. The second is that where he correctly attacks the Eurocentric mistakes made by the usually also very heterodox ideas in these fields of Marx and his supporters, he goes overboard in this in wanting to reject the idea of 'capitalism' and 'feudalism' altogether, which is not helpful, and leads himself to remove all useful analysis of production and classes from his historical overview. This in turn leads to the major error in his approach, which is the excessive focus on trade, particularly foreign trade, as vehicle for historical change. The third is that Frank seems to want to put much stock instead into the independent power of cyclical phenomena in economics such as the Kondratieff cycle; surely an interesting phenomenon but not one that can be taken as causative on its own without losing the scientific method in political economy altogether. The fourth is the focus on Asia, which comes almost entirely at the expense of focus on Africa, and to a lesser degree the Americas. Nonetheless, this book also contains all that is the best of André Gunder Frank, such as his immense knowledge, his courage in rejecting and questioning received opinion, his effectiveness in refuting Eurocentrism, and his strong ability to make much use of what is often little or confused historical-statistical information. For these reasons, this book is a masterpiece that belongs in any intellectual library.
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