Product: Book ISBN-10: 1-84415-168-9 ISBN-13: 9781844151684 Publisher: Pen and Sword Country: Year: September 2005 Size: 16.00 x 20.80 x 0.99cm Number of pages: 144 Weight: 281gr Binding: Paperback
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Product Description The Battles of Quatre Bras and Ligny are often overshadowed by the Battle of Waterloo that took place two days later. Yet the events of 16 June 1815 were crucial, as Napoleon missed his chance of achieving a decisive victory.
Peter Hofschroer's authoritative guide to these two critical engagements tells the story of the campaign and investigates each battle in detail, and he takes the reader on a fascinating tour of the present-day battlefields.
By skillful use of maps, photographs and diagrams, he describes the movements of the armies and analyses the thinking and actions of the commanders.
reviews
Readable account of initial battles of 1815 campaign.
Peter Hofschroer's book on Battles of Quatre Bras and Ligny proves to be pretty well written and illustrated. The book gives a pretty good account of the initial stages of the One Hundred Days Campaign and the first two battles fought prior to the main event. The book appears to be geared for general reader and those traveling in that region since the book often read much like a tour book with its many maps, photographs and short biographies of important personalities during this stage of the 1815 campaign.
I have to admit that the author managed to keep his »pro-Prussian« biases at check most of the time. Although I disagreed with his accessment of Wellington's performance at Quatre Bras like the previous reviewer, I can see where he was coming from. Of course, it would be hard to condemn Wellington unless you are doing the same with Blucher who lost a bigger battle. Napoleon don't seem to get much credit in this book despite of the fact that he was winning the campaign up to this point.
But the book do have my recommedation, the writing is clear, tour guide stuff are interesting and readers will come off with a pretty good understanding of both battles despite of some eccentric opinions expressed by the author.
Overcome by production flaws
Peter Hofschroer is perhaps the leading authority on Waterloo. This small book is a very quick and detailed account of the battles of Quatre Bras and Ligny, two days before Waterloo. The accuracy of the historical details is beyond question.
Unfortunately, the book is diminished by it's production flaws. The shortage of detailed maps hurts the account. For example, there is no map of the movements for the Quatre Bras. Some minor complaints are the occasional typo, a page with the wrong chapter heading, an incorrect death date on one of the biography boxes, a biography box that continues it's shading into the main text, a notable lack of color, and the absence of an index.
I'll be reading the second short volume, Waterloo 1815: Wavre, Plancenoit, and the Race to Paris next. A quick survey of the book shows that it has the same production issues.
I won't be reading any other Pen & Sword books. However, I look forward to reading other works by Peter Hofschroer. I hope he uses another publisher.
The Prequel to Waterloo
In this short but informative book designed for the general reader, Peter Hofschroer place the battles of Quatre Bras and Ligny in their proper context within the campaign of Waterloo, as Napoleon's best opportunity for a decisive victory.
The campaign opens with the sudden lunge of Napoleon's Armee du Nord across the Belgian border on 15 June 1815. Napoleon achieves tactical surprise and creates a small gap between Blutcher's Prussian Army and Wellington's Anglo-Dutch-German army. Hofscnhroer's narrative describes Napoleon's efforts on 16 June to drive the two armies apart and defeat them in detail. The Prussians concentrate at Ligny, where they are attacked by Napoleon and defeated but not destroyed in a hard-fought battle. Wellington, expecting Napoleon on another avenue of approach into Belgium, is caught wrong-footed and takes nearly 24 hours to begin to concentrate his army in the right place. Thanks to the initiative of Dutch and German forces at Quatre Bras who hold their own against superior French numbers through most of 16 June, British reinforcements arrive just in time to enable Wellington to hold the crossroads and avoid being driven away from the Prussians. Napoleon's sole uncommitted corps spends the day tracking and backtracking between the two battles without getting into action. Its presence at either might have been decisive.
After his victory at Ligny, Napoleon fails to maintain contact with the retreating Prussians and, assuming they are out of the fight, turns on Wellington. The Prussian Army, in a remarkable display of fortitude for what Hofschroer describes as a young and relatively inexperienced organization, reconstitutes itself overnight and moves back not on its lines of communication but toward its allies. With the promise of Prussian reinforcement, the Anglo-Dutch-German Army retreats to its chosen ground at Mount St Jean, where, thanks to Wellington's superb tactical leadership, it will fight the French to a desperate stand-still until the timely arrival of the Prussians makes possible a decisive victory.
In addition to the battle narrative, Hofschroer provides concise biographies of the key leaders in the fighting of 15 and 16 June. His book is nicely outfitted with photographs, prints, and diagrams that provide a feel for the setting and the action. An appendix provides the respective orders of battle for each army.
The author pulls no punches in his assessment of the senior leaders. Napoleon, having achieved an opportune position between the two Allied armies, fails to capitalize on 16-17 June through sloppy staff work and insufficiently vigorous reconnaissance. The aging but ferocious Blutcher is described as so mentally unstable that his army is actually run by a hand-picked general staff officer. Wellington, in Hofschroer's opinion, is almost fatally too slow to grasp the nature of Napoleon's offensive and reposition his troops; the author awards credit for the stand at Quatre Bras to the young Prince of Orange and his Dutch and German troops.
Hofschroer pursues two themes in the course of the narrative, which will be familiar to those who have read his two volume history of Waterloo. One theme is to apportion proper credit to the Dutch, German, and Prussian units who did most of the Allied fighting on 15 and 16 June and who would also play a major, even decisive role at Waterloo. It is a fair observation that most English language studies of Waterloo tend to overemphasize the role of the British units, and Hofschroer attempts to redress that imbalance for the general reader in this book. The second theme, that Wellington badly fumbled the management of his army on 15 and 16 June, relies on a fairly harsh interpretation of the limited surviving evidence and probably gives too little credit to Wellington for dealing with a fluid situation in which Napoleon had more options than he chose to exercise. Hofschroer briefly explores his interpretation at the end of this book; interested readers should consult the vast literature on Waterloo for a more complete picture.
This book is highly recommended for the casual reader and for the student of military art seeking a grasp of the prequel battles to the more famous battle of Waterloo.