1815: The Waterloo Campaign-The German Victory (Greenhill Military Paperback)
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Product: Book
ISBN-10: 1-85367-578-4
ISBN-13: 9781853675782
Publisher: Greenhill Books
Country:
Year: February 19, 2006
Size: 15.60 x 23.39 x 3.20cm
Number of pages: 376
Weight: 581gr
Binding: Paperback
ISBN-10: 1-85367-578-4
ISBN-13: 9781853675782
Publisher: Greenhill Books
Country:
Year: February 19, 2006
Size: 15.60 x 23.39 x 3.20cm
Number of pages: 376
Weight: 581gr
Binding: Paperback
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Product Description
In this masterly study of 1815, Peter Hofschroer challenges the accepted version of events at the Battle of Waterloo. He demonstrates convincingly that Allied victory hinged on the contribution of German soldiers. Drawing on previously unpublished accounts, Hofschroer gives not only the Prussian perspective of their march to Waterloo and decisive attack on Napoleon's flank, but also details of the actions fought by some of the 25,000 Germans in Wellington's »British« army--more than a third of the duke's force.
In this masterly study of 1815, Peter Hofschroer challenges the accepted version of events at the Battle of Waterloo. He demonstrates convincingly that Allied victory hinged on the contribution of German soldiers. Drawing on previously unpublished accounts, Hofschroer gives not only the Prussian perspective of their march to Waterloo and decisive attack on Napoleon's flank, but also details of the actions fought by some of the 25,000 Germans in Wellington's »British« army--more than a third of the duke's force.
reviews
Overrated book 
This is revisionist history. It is not the first book to state that the Brits did not win Waterloo, nor will it be the last. The coverage of Waterloo is fixated only on the issue of Wellington's culpability in covering his tracks. The other irritating theme is that the Germans won Waterloo by sheer numbers of Germanic people represented in the campaign. For a full understanding of the roles played by the French, the Brits, the Dutch-Belgians, you'll have to look elsewhere. So how can this book be the definitive book on Waterloo?
This is revisionist history. It is not the first book to state that the Brits did not win Waterloo, nor will it be the last. The coverage of Waterloo is fixated only on the issue of Wellington's culpability in covering his tracks. The other irritating theme is that the Germans won Waterloo by sheer numbers of Germanic people represented in the campaign. For a full understanding of the roles played by the French, the Brits, the Dutch-Belgians, you'll have to look elsewhere. So how can this book be the definitive book on Waterloo?
Required Reading; Golden Opportunity Squandered 
My review is intended to refer to both parts of Peter Hofschroer's two-decker history of the events of June-July 1815. Indeed, it is a shame in way that they were published separately, for the events (and Hofschroer's narrative of them) are a seamless unit. Hofschroer has performed an inestimable service by making available, in magnificent detail and fluent English, the story of the Prussian side of the events of June-July 1815. That story has for far too long been glossed over, minimised, almost ignored in English-language histories. Hofschroer has removed for ever the (always slight) excuse given by lack of a good English narrative of the Prussians' deeds. Nothing can take away his achievement in doing that, no matter how flawed his books are (IMHO) by chauvinism, misrepresentation and downright silliness. Hofschroer reveals the new Prussian army's enormous strength of organisation and morale, which enabled it to resume a decisive offensive within 36 hours of its defeat at Ligny, and the formidable tactical grasp of its commanders in the final crisis. Rather than simply falling into line with Wellington's tattered left flank, leaving the French the possibility of withdrawal, the Prussians detached the minimum forces needed to prevent a collapse there, and maintained their drive on the French right rear round Plancenoit. That ground once gained (at terrible cost, for Napoleon knew equally how vital it was) there was no escape for the French as a formed army; their dissolution in rout was the fruit of a brilliant tactical insight ruthlessly executed. But, above all, Hofschroer gives us, for the first time in English, the human voice of the Prussian combatants. We have long been accustomed to the voices of Harris and Kincaid, Marbot and Marcel; now we hear their German contemporaries. With all this wealth of scholarship at his command, Hofschroer had the opportunity to write the first genuinely balanced history of the Waterloo-Paris campaign, recognising the vital contributions of all the Allies. For an Allied victory (not German, not British) it certainly was. Wellington's decision to stand at Waterloo was based on his agreements with Blucher and Gneisenau for Prussian intervention, and the Prussian advance was predicated on Napoleon being pinned in front by the Anglo-Dutch forces. Neither Allied army could have won, and either or both might have been annihilated, without that basic trust and cooperation. Unfortunately, Hofschroer has sunk to the occasion. He seems to be of that mind-set which believes that balance consists of equal and opposing biases; this works fine for crankshafts, less well for history. In his efforts to redress the pro-British bias of Anglophone histories, he veers to an equal extreme of pro-Prussian bias. His industry and judgement in assembling and selecting data are magnificent; his interpretations are all too often openly, sometimes farcically, partisan. It will probably be another generation before someone achieves a genuine synthesis. It seems to me Hofschroer's problem (my categorisation, not his) stems basically from a view, widespread in Germany, of the events of 1813-15 as the spiritual birthplace of modern (i.e. Prussian-led) Germany and the precursor of national unification. This is the German equivalent of Manifest Destiny, and Germans of even mildly nationalist tendencies bristle at any perception that it is being downplayed or marginalised – as it certainly has been in Anglophone histories. This leads him not to follow through on his genuine insight that Prussia and Britain were pursuing quite different war aims in 1815. The Prussians were seeking revenge for defeat and occupation, and the opportunity to resume Frederick the Great's programme of expansion. The British, on the other hand, wanted to restore France as an orderly member of the European family of nations, powerful enough to act as a check to Austrian, Russian – or Prussian – expansionism if necessary. A similar contrast marked the aims of Russia and the western allies regarding Germany in 1945. It also leads him to downplay the shameless behaviour of the Prussians towards their Saxon allies, 20,000 of whom were sent back from the theatre of war, almost on the eve of battle, after Prussian mistreatment drove them to mutiny. Presumably Saxons don't count as Germans in the context of 'German Victory'. The urge to magnify Prussia's glory years also leads Hofschroer into some very silly positions. He snipes persistently at the disbursement of 'British gold' which he seems to believe unfairly attracted Germans who would otherwise have fought for Prussia. One might point out that the British had retained the old-fashioned habit of paying for goods and services received, in contrast to the Prussians who had discovered the attractions of Napoleon's methods of extortion. More to the point, however, without the 'British gold' the non-Prussian German contingents in Belgium would have been another bankrupt farce like the German Corps on the Rhine (eloquently described by Hofschroer himself). Without them the Allied line on Mont St Jean would have been 30% shorter, and Napoleon would have broken through before the Prussians arrived. The silliest assertions of all, however, are those around the alleged 'race to Paris' which Hofschroer dwells on almost obsessively in the second volume. It takes a minimum of two to have a race and there is nothing in Hofschroer's account that indicates the British were competing. I for one decline to believe that the Prussian command, so perceptive in its operational planning, was foolish enough to engage in the sort of steeple-chase Hofschroer describes. A far more plausible interpretation is that the Prussians pressed forward in the hope of taking Paris on the fly, and being brought up short before the northern defences had to wait for the British, who had all the siege guns. Probably Wellington, who (Hofschroer concedes) had far better intelligence sources in Paris, knew all along that would happen, and saw no point in wearing out men and horses to no avail.
My review is intended to refer to both parts of Peter Hofschroer's two-decker history of the events of June-July 1815. Indeed, it is a shame in way that they were published separately, for the events (and Hofschroer's narrative of them) are a seamless unit. Hofschroer has performed an inestimable service by making available, in magnificent detail and fluent English, the story of the Prussian side of the events of June-July 1815. That story has for far too long been glossed over, minimised, almost ignored in English-language histories. Hofschroer has removed for ever the (always slight) excuse given by lack of a good English narrative of the Prussians' deeds. Nothing can take away his achievement in doing that, no matter how flawed his books are (IMHO) by chauvinism, misrepresentation and downright silliness. Hofschroer reveals the new Prussian army's enormous strength of organisation and morale, which enabled it to resume a decisive offensive within 36 hours of its defeat at Ligny, and the formidable tactical grasp of its commanders in the final crisis. Rather than simply falling into line with Wellington's tattered left flank, leaving the French the possibility of withdrawal, the Prussians detached the minimum forces needed to prevent a collapse there, and maintained their drive on the French right rear round Plancenoit. That ground once gained (at terrible cost, for Napoleon knew equally how vital it was) there was no escape for the French as a formed army; their dissolution in rout was the fruit of a brilliant tactical insight ruthlessly executed. But, above all, Hofschroer gives us, for the first time in English, the human voice of the Prussian combatants. We have long been accustomed to the voices of Harris and Kincaid, Marbot and Marcel; now we hear their German contemporaries. With all this wealth of scholarship at his command, Hofschroer had the opportunity to write the first genuinely balanced history of the Waterloo-Paris campaign, recognising the vital contributions of all the Allies. For an Allied victory (not German, not British) it certainly was. Wellington's decision to stand at Waterloo was based on his agreements with Blucher and Gneisenau for Prussian intervention, and the Prussian advance was predicated on Napoleon being pinned in front by the Anglo-Dutch forces. Neither Allied army could have won, and either or both might have been annihilated, without that basic trust and cooperation. Unfortunately, Hofschroer has sunk to the occasion. He seems to be of that mind-set which believes that balance consists of equal and opposing biases; this works fine for crankshafts, less well for history. In his efforts to redress the pro-British bias of Anglophone histories, he veers to an equal extreme of pro-Prussian bias. His industry and judgement in assembling and selecting data are magnificent; his interpretations are all too often openly, sometimes farcically, partisan. It will probably be another generation before someone achieves a genuine synthesis. It seems to me Hofschroer's problem (my categorisation, not his) stems basically from a view, widespread in Germany, of the events of 1813-15 as the spiritual birthplace of modern (i.e. Prussian-led) Germany and the precursor of national unification. This is the German equivalent of Manifest Destiny, and Germans of even mildly nationalist tendencies bristle at any perception that it is being downplayed or marginalised – as it certainly has been in Anglophone histories. This leads him not to follow through on his genuine insight that Prussia and Britain were pursuing quite different war aims in 1815. The Prussians were seeking revenge for defeat and occupation, and the opportunity to resume Frederick the Great's programme of expansion. The British, on the other hand, wanted to restore France as an orderly member of the European family of nations, powerful enough to act as a check to Austrian, Russian – or Prussian – expansionism if necessary. A similar contrast marked the aims of Russia and the western allies regarding Germany in 1945. It also leads him to downplay the shameless behaviour of the Prussians towards their Saxon allies, 20,000 of whom were sent back from the theatre of war, almost on the eve of battle, after Prussian mistreatment drove them to mutiny. Presumably Saxons don't count as Germans in the context of 'German Victory'. The urge to magnify Prussia's glory years also leads Hofschroer into some very silly positions. He snipes persistently at the disbursement of 'British gold' which he seems to believe unfairly attracted Germans who would otherwise have fought for Prussia. One might point out that the British had retained the old-fashioned habit of paying for goods and services received, in contrast to the Prussians who had discovered the attractions of Napoleon's methods of extortion. More to the point, however, without the 'British gold' the non-Prussian German contingents in Belgium would have been another bankrupt farce like the German Corps on the Rhine (eloquently described by Hofschroer himself). Without them the Allied line on Mont St Jean would have been 30% shorter, and Napoleon would have broken through before the Prussians arrived. The silliest assertions of all, however, are those around the alleged 'race to Paris' which Hofschroer dwells on almost obsessively in the second volume. It takes a minimum of two to have a race and there is nothing in Hofschroer's account that indicates the British were competing. I for one decline to believe that the Prussian command, so perceptive in its operational planning, was foolish enough to engage in the sort of steeple-chase Hofschroer describes. A far more plausible interpretation is that the Prussians pressed forward in the hope of taking Paris on the fly, and being brought up short before the northern defences had to wait for the British, who had all the siege guns. Probably Wellington, who (Hofschroer concedes) had far better intelligence sources in Paris, knew all along that would happen, and saw no point in wearing out men and horses to no avail.
Purchase this book for balance's sake, if nothing else …
Too much had been said and written about Waterloo, although I never could recall any one of them ever provided a balanced perspective of both Allied and Prussian contributions to the effort. Unfortunately, most publications on this side of the Atlantic tended to focus on the British point of view, and Wellington's supposed tactical ingenuity. Lauded as one of the most 'decisive' battles in history, a program on A&E called Waterloo a 'clandestine clash between two Titans' (obviously leaving Blucher out of the picture), while other similar presentations had nothing but Wellington. I seldom hear Prussians being mentioned in these televised programs, and if I did, usually in the last few minutes, I was lucky. But, lo' n' behold, '1815: The Waterloo Campaign-The German Victory', a book that finally steers away from generally accepted views. I have to admit, I find myself in agreement with a large portion of the author's argument. Personally, I hold reservations in regards to Wellington's capabilities as a general and Waterloo's significance. To me, Waterloo was just the final battle of a desperate old man, by then crippled with numerous physical discomfort expected of his age. It was the last battle of the Napoleonic Wars, just as Berlin was the last battle in the European theater of WWII. Napoleon's army wasn't in tip-top shape either. After losing most of it in Russia, followed by Leipzig, his army by the time of Waterloo consisted mostly of raw recruits. Hardly the once feared Grand Armee. Really, I don't think its a miracle that Waterloo was won, but rather, it'd be a miracle if Napoleon wasn't beaten! Nevertheless, Waterloo or not, Napoleon's days were numbered. If the British weren't involved, the Prussians, combined with Austrian and Russian armies would have overwhelmed him (again) elsewhere, and a fate worse than exile would have awaited the former French Emperor. But, Waterloo was made possible because both Wellington and Blucher wanted to shed French blood as soon as they could. As for Wellington, I believe the man had merits, but I doubt he was as great as many of his biographies claimed him to be. Yes, he held the line against Napoleon and the relentless assault of his army while waiting for the Prussians to arrive. Granted, Wellington pulled it off very well, but that was all he did, against a sick old-man and his beaten army (nonetheless one that would have certainly beaten Wellington had the Prussians failed to show). If Prussian support was not available, and Wellington chose to fight on, then Napoleon could have slowly grind Wellington's coalition armies into pieces without having to race against time. Yet, Wellington was not the first man to defeat French armies on the field of battle. Others, such as Austria's Archduke Charles, had beaten Napoleon's feared Grand Armee at the height of French expansion, while General Kutuzov of Russia utilized scorched-Earth policy and bleed Napoleon dry during his ill-fated invasion of Russia. But neither of them got as much credit as Wellington. Indeed, history is biased. Personally, I consider Nelson to be far more brilliant as a commander than Wellington, and Trafalgar to be more significant than Waterloo. Why? Consider this, if Nelson failed to stop the French navy, nothing would have prevented the Grand Armee from launching a full-scale invasion against England. If that had happened, well? Forget Waterloo, hell, forget Wellington. Regardless of my personal views on Waterloo though, it does not mean I believe in a German victory, either. Waterloo was simply a choice made by two (very motivated) parties with similar interests. Nothing more, and nothing less. Blucher and Wellington decided to finish Napoleon then and there, and they did just that. Neither Blucher nor Wellington could have achieved victory by themselves. They needed each other. Wellington, judging by his biographies, craved fame and glory while Blucher essentially operated almost on personal vendetta. I would not be surprised if the only thing that went through old Blucher's mind was »death to Napoleon, death to Napoleon, kill, kill, kill … *repeat*«. Still, I purchased this book for balance's sake. One of the main reasons being my belief that the German (Prussian) voice had been silenced in most of the historical studies that had something to do with Waterloo, and this is one of the few books I know, where their voices could be heard, in lengthy, carefully studied details. Kudos to Peter Hofschrser in his attempt to challenge, and essentially help balance conventional views. After all, Napoleon did say the following: »Ah ! Wellington ought to light a fine candle to old Blucher. Without him, I don't know where His Grace, as they call him, would be; but as for me, I certainly wouldn't be here.« PS. As for previous reviewers who were concerned with Germany not being a 'state' during the Napoleonic Wars: Yes, it is true. Germany did not exist as a nation-state then, but I doubt that was what the author was referring to. While the nation-state did not exist, the historical 'Germany' did. Germany and Germans would have been a reference to the historical geographical location of 'Germany' and its people.
Too much had been said and written about Waterloo, although I never could recall any one of them ever provided a balanced perspective of both Allied and Prussian contributions to the effort. Unfortunately, most publications on this side of the Atlantic tended to focus on the British point of view, and Wellington's supposed tactical ingenuity. Lauded as one of the most 'decisive' battles in history, a program on A&E called Waterloo a 'clandestine clash between two Titans' (obviously leaving Blucher out of the picture), while other similar presentations had nothing but Wellington. I seldom hear Prussians being mentioned in these televised programs, and if I did, usually in the last few minutes, I was lucky. But, lo' n' behold, '1815: The Waterloo Campaign-The German Victory', a book that finally steers away from generally accepted views. I have to admit, I find myself in agreement with a large portion of the author's argument. Personally, I hold reservations in regards to Wellington's capabilities as a general and Waterloo's significance. To me, Waterloo was just the final battle of a desperate old man, by then crippled with numerous physical discomfort expected of his age. It was the last battle of the Napoleonic Wars, just as Berlin was the last battle in the European theater of WWII. Napoleon's army wasn't in tip-top shape either. After losing most of it in Russia, followed by Leipzig, his army by the time of Waterloo consisted mostly of raw recruits. Hardly the once feared Grand Armee. Really, I don't think its a miracle that Waterloo was won, but rather, it'd be a miracle if Napoleon wasn't beaten! Nevertheless, Waterloo or not, Napoleon's days were numbered. If the British weren't involved, the Prussians, combined with Austrian and Russian armies would have overwhelmed him (again) elsewhere, and a fate worse than exile would have awaited the former French Emperor. But, Waterloo was made possible because both Wellington and Blucher wanted to shed French blood as soon as they could. As for Wellington, I believe the man had merits, but I doubt he was as great as many of his biographies claimed him to be. Yes, he held the line against Napoleon and the relentless assault of his army while waiting for the Prussians to arrive. Granted, Wellington pulled it off very well, but that was all he did, against a sick old-man and his beaten army (nonetheless one that would have certainly beaten Wellington had the Prussians failed to show). If Prussian support was not available, and Wellington chose to fight on, then Napoleon could have slowly grind Wellington's coalition armies into pieces without having to race against time. Yet, Wellington was not the first man to defeat French armies on the field of battle. Others, such as Austria's Archduke Charles, had beaten Napoleon's feared Grand Armee at the height of French expansion, while General Kutuzov of Russia utilized scorched-Earth policy and bleed Napoleon dry during his ill-fated invasion of Russia. But neither of them got as much credit as Wellington. Indeed, history is biased. Personally, I consider Nelson to be far more brilliant as a commander than Wellington, and Trafalgar to be more significant than Waterloo. Why? Consider this, if Nelson failed to stop the French navy, nothing would have prevented the Grand Armee from launching a full-scale invasion against England. If that had happened, well? Forget Waterloo, hell, forget Wellington. Regardless of my personal views on Waterloo though, it does not mean I believe in a German victory, either. Waterloo was simply a choice made by two (very motivated) parties with similar interests. Nothing more, and nothing less. Blucher and Wellington decided to finish Napoleon then and there, and they did just that. Neither Blucher nor Wellington could have achieved victory by themselves. They needed each other. Wellington, judging by his biographies, craved fame and glory while Blucher essentially operated almost on personal vendetta. I would not be surprised if the only thing that went through old Blucher's mind was »death to Napoleon, death to Napoleon, kill, kill, kill … *repeat*«. Still, I purchased this book for balance's sake. One of the main reasons being my belief that the German (Prussian) voice had been silenced in most of the historical studies that had something to do with Waterloo, and this is one of the few books I know, where their voices could be heard, in lengthy, carefully studied details. Kudos to Peter Hofschrser in his attempt to challenge, and essentially help balance conventional views. After all, Napoleon did say the following: »Ah ! Wellington ought to light a fine candle to old Blucher. Without him, I don't know where His Grace, as they call him, would be; but as for me, I certainly wouldn't be here.« PS. As for previous reviewers who were concerned with Germany not being a 'state' during the Napoleonic Wars: Yes, it is true. Germany did not exist as a nation-state then, but I doubt that was what the author was referring to. While the nation-state did not exist, the historical 'Germany' did. Germany and Germans would have been a reference to the historical geographical location of 'Germany' and its people.
Simple the Best Book about the Waterloo Campaign 
The title says it all. It isn't Brit bashing at all. It is simply history finally coming the to light of day.
The title says it all. It isn't Brit bashing at all. It is simply history finally coming the to light of day.
Of all the Allies that fought Napoleon during this campain, only 15% were British! Of all the casualties that the Allied armies suffered, only 17% were British, 8% were Netherlanders, and 75% were German. Now, that should tell you something.
This is only part of what Peter Hofschroer brings to us in this excellent book. It deverves to be on every Napoleonic enthusiast's bookshelf. That and his comapion book about the battle of Ligny and Quatre Bras.
What bollocks 
Considering the prussians were beaten back early on the first day. And that they didnt arrive till 430 in the afternoon i can not for the life of me see why that you can say it was a prussian victory. The truth my anus. It most definatley was an allied victory. If wellington would have retreated to the channel the prussians would have retreated back accross the rhine. Like wellington said it was a close run thing but with out the British holding at waterloo there would have been no victory. If your serious about history then read all the books about this battle and you will see that the victory was gained by the combined efforts of the allied force and not one could have done it with out the other. As for the gemanic peoples give me a break the English are a germanic people . Also to slag off wellington when he was the only general that was undefeated in the pennisular campaign is not looking at facts. If you want to read such tripe and biast brit bashing then i recomend you stick to hollywoods history of the American empire and leave serious history to those who are actualy intreasted in the facts and not to a history that has been created by its nations film industry.
Considering the prussians were beaten back early on the first day. And that they didnt arrive till 430 in the afternoon i can not for the life of me see why that you can say it was a prussian victory. The truth my anus. It most definatley was an allied victory. If wellington would have retreated to the channel the prussians would have retreated back accross the rhine. Like wellington said it was a close run thing but with out the British holding at waterloo there would have been no victory. If your serious about history then read all the books about this battle and you will see that the victory was gained by the combined efforts of the allied force and not one could have done it with out the other. As for the gemanic peoples give me a break the English are a germanic people . Also to slag off wellington when he was the only general that was undefeated in the pennisular campaign is not looking at facts. If you want to read such tripe and biast brit bashing then i recomend you stick to hollywoods history of the American empire and leave serious history to those who are actualy intreasted in the facts and not to a history that has been created by its nations film industry.
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