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Product: Book
ISBN-10: 1-85367-644-6
ISBN-13: 9781853676444
Publisher: Greenhill Books
Country:
Year: August 20, 2005
Size: 16.51 x 23.62 x 3.05cm
Number of pages: 368
Weight: 590gr
Binding: Hardcover
ISBN-10: 1-85367-644-6
ISBN-13: 9781853676444
Publisher: Greenhill Books
Country:
Year: August 20, 2005
Size: 16.51 x 23.62 x 3.05cm
Number of pages: 368
Weight: 590gr
Binding: Hardcover
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Product Description
Revealing new study of Napoleon's greatest victory. Dispels many of the myths surrounding the famous battle of the three emperors. Brought to life with numerous eyewitness accounts. A Main Selection for the History Book Club. The Battle of Austerlitz is almost universally regarded as the most impressive of Napoleon's many victories. The magnitude of the French achievement against a significantly larger army was unprecedented. In this insightful new study the author analyses the planning of the opposing forces and details the course of the battle hour by hour, describing the fierce see-saw battle around Sokolnitz, the epic struggle for the Pratzen Heights, the dramatic engagement between the legendary Lannes and Bagration in the north, and the widely misunderstood clash of Napoleon's Imperial Guard and Alexander's Imperial Leib-Guard. The author has produced a detailed and balanced assessment of the battle that for the first time places familiar French accounts in their proper perspective and exposes many myths regarding the battle that have been perpetuated and even embellished in recent books. With 1805: Austerlitz, the reader is left with a new appreciation of Napoleon and his Grande Army of 1805, an army that decisively defeated not a hapless relic of the ancien regime but rather a formidable professional army that had fought the French armies on equal terms five years earlier. Robert Goetz has been studying the Russian Army of the Napoleonic Wars for the past seven years, an area of specialization that emerged from his longstanding interest in the French Revolution and Napoleonic era. He is the author of several award-winning articles concerning the Russian Army and its campaigns.
reviews
Greatly detailed depiction of a smashing Napoleonic victory 
Austerlitz can legitimately be described as one of the greatest of Napoleon Bonaparte's victories. The battle destroyed the coalition among Austrians, Prussians, and Russians. The Holy Roman Empire was finally (and mercifully) terminated. This volume looks at the actual nitty gritty details of the Austerlitz campaign. The author notes that (page 13): »The story of the 1805 Campaign and the stunning victory of Austerlitz is the story of the beginning of the Napoleon of history and the Grande Armee of legend.« Good features of this book: plenty of maps to lay out the progression of events, the order of battle, an estimate of the armies' strengths, an assessment of casualties in both armies. This book is also distinguished by providing great amounts of information from the allies' perspective, rather than just from the French and Napoleonic viewpoint. The story begins with the start of hostilities between France and her adversaries after the Treaty of Amiens in 1802, which temporarily brought peace to Europe. The volume starts off with an assessment of the strength of the various allied armies as well as the French forces and the early maneuvering of the various forces. The destruction of the incompetently led Austrain forces at Ulm are described well. The Austrian General, Mack, completely failed against Napoleon. After that defeat, the allies began gathering their troops together to continue the struggle against the French. Russian armies began the march from the motherland. Austrian forces begin to gather. Even Prussia was willing to enter on the side of the allies, although its forces would be unable to participate at Austerlitz. Once the allies began to gather their horde, the movement of the French and allies began to lead to battle. Both forces ended up gathering near the village of Austerlitz. Napoleon began to develop alternative strategies, contingent upon what the allies did. The prime mover of the allied strategic choices, Weyrother, conceived an attack on the French right, without assuming that Napoleon might not just sit around waiting to be attacked. Indeed, Napoleon had already thought through what he would do if such an attack took place. The logistics of the allied forces moving to the offensive were strained; communication between Austrians and Russians (calling for translation) went awry. Napoleon launched an attack on the crucial Pratzen Heights. While the fighting was at times fierce, he had hit the Russians when they were unprepared, as they moved to attack Napoleon's right. Once he had control of the Heights, his army had cut the allied forces in two. There begin the attack on the flank and rear of the allies attacking the French right. Things fell apart rapidly. While the Russians fought well, the game was pretty much up. Some allies, such as Bagration, fought well. Others appeared to be stupefied by what was happening. One nice aspect of the concluding discussion is the rating of the various major figures on both sides. Some, like Bagration, come off very well. Others, like Buxhowden, come off badly. Overall, the French leaders appear to have done a better job. As others note, it would have been helpful if there were a bit more information on the leaders as human beings. In the end, perhaps Napoleon's greatest triumph. This led to a peace agreement that ended to »third coalition« of allies against France. The book is written in excruciating detail. Keeping units and leaders straight is not easy. On the other hand, the detail provides as clear a sense of this critical battle as anyone could hope for.
Austerlitz can legitimately be described as one of the greatest of Napoleon Bonaparte's victories. The battle destroyed the coalition among Austrians, Prussians, and Russians. The Holy Roman Empire was finally (and mercifully) terminated. This volume looks at the actual nitty gritty details of the Austerlitz campaign. The author notes that (page 13): »The story of the 1805 Campaign and the stunning victory of Austerlitz is the story of the beginning of the Napoleon of history and the Grande Armee of legend.« Good features of this book: plenty of maps to lay out the progression of events, the order of battle, an estimate of the armies' strengths, an assessment of casualties in both armies. This book is also distinguished by providing great amounts of information from the allies' perspective, rather than just from the French and Napoleonic viewpoint. The story begins with the start of hostilities between France and her adversaries after the Treaty of Amiens in 1802, which temporarily brought peace to Europe. The volume starts off with an assessment of the strength of the various allied armies as well as the French forces and the early maneuvering of the various forces. The destruction of the incompetently led Austrain forces at Ulm are described well. The Austrian General, Mack, completely failed against Napoleon. After that defeat, the allies began gathering their troops together to continue the struggle against the French. Russian armies began the march from the motherland. Austrian forces begin to gather. Even Prussia was willing to enter on the side of the allies, although its forces would be unable to participate at Austerlitz. Once the allies began to gather their horde, the movement of the French and allies began to lead to battle. Both forces ended up gathering near the village of Austerlitz. Napoleon began to develop alternative strategies, contingent upon what the allies did. The prime mover of the allied strategic choices, Weyrother, conceived an attack on the French right, without assuming that Napoleon might not just sit around waiting to be attacked. Indeed, Napoleon had already thought through what he would do if such an attack took place. The logistics of the allied forces moving to the offensive were strained; communication between Austrians and Russians (calling for translation) went awry. Napoleon launched an attack on the crucial Pratzen Heights. While the fighting was at times fierce, he had hit the Russians when they were unprepared, as they moved to attack Napoleon's right. Once he had control of the Heights, his army had cut the allied forces in two. There begin the attack on the flank and rear of the allies attacking the French right. Things fell apart rapidly. While the Russians fought well, the game was pretty much up. Some allies, such as Bagration, fought well. Others appeared to be stupefied by what was happening. One nice aspect of the concluding discussion is the rating of the various major figures on both sides. Some, like Bagration, come off very well. Others, like Buxhowden, come off badly. Overall, the French leaders appear to have done a better job. As others note, it would have been helpful if there were a bit more information on the leaders as human beings. In the end, perhaps Napoleon's greatest triumph. This led to a peace agreement that ended to »third coalition« of allies against France. The book is written in excruciating detail. Keeping units and leaders straight is not easy. On the other hand, the detail provides as clear a sense of this critical battle as anyone could hope for.
Thorough detailed account
This is a very thorough and detailed account of perhaps Napoleon's greatest victory (and certainly the one he was most proud of). The author briefly writes of how the battle came about by the failure of the treaty of Aimens and the formation of the third coalition against France. The author covers the the pre battle tactical and polictical maneuvering and the major personalities involved, with both sides attempting to put their forces into position to ultimately acheive decisive victory. However, it was Napoleon that was able read his Russian & Austrian opponents rashness and enticed them to draw off the bulk of their forces to attack his right flank and leaving the dominant Pratzen heights vulnerable to attack by the French. The battle itself is well covered off with the author detailing the movement of forces and blow by blow account of the battle. In fact the detail is such that it sometimes hard to take all in, but thankfully the author had the foresight to use maps to show the movement of forces at various places & times of battle so the reader can better visualise his narrative. Goetz also makes use of some first hand accounts that give weight to his own explaination of battle. The author suggests that was perhaps the French tactical prowess in the field (after months of training at Camp Bologne in anticipation of the invasion of Britain)that gave the French the edge. 'This was demonstrated repeatly by the effectiveness of their musketry, their cool maneuvering under fire, effective coordination of combined arms operations and larger larger scale maneuvers, and a superb discipline produced by high morale and complete confidence in their commanders'. The French command & control system also had flexibilty enabling commanders to adapt & maneuver their forces to changing situations to acheive ultimate mission objectives (that is very similar to the German Army in the WWII in its Blitzkreig). The Russian and Austrian forces typically seemed to be locked and awaiting orders from above losing valuable time & few officers used their initiative. Having said that the Russian & Austrian forces fought hard and bravely and at times were able to throw the French back. In the end it was Napoleon's careful planning, use of detailed information about the enemy and the ability to acheive numerical superiority at a given point that led to his decisive victory.
This is a very thorough and detailed account of perhaps Napoleon's greatest victory (and certainly the one he was most proud of). The author briefly writes of how the battle came about by the failure of the treaty of Aimens and the formation of the third coalition against France. The author covers the the pre battle tactical and polictical maneuvering and the major personalities involved, with both sides attempting to put their forces into position to ultimately acheive decisive victory. However, it was Napoleon that was able read his Russian & Austrian opponents rashness and enticed them to draw off the bulk of their forces to attack his right flank and leaving the dominant Pratzen heights vulnerable to attack by the French. The battle itself is well covered off with the author detailing the movement of forces and blow by blow account of the battle. In fact the detail is such that it sometimes hard to take all in, but thankfully the author had the foresight to use maps to show the movement of forces at various places & times of battle so the reader can better visualise his narrative. Goetz also makes use of some first hand accounts that give weight to his own explaination of battle. The author suggests that was perhaps the French tactical prowess in the field (after months of training at Camp Bologne in anticipation of the invasion of Britain)that gave the French the edge. 'This was demonstrated repeatly by the effectiveness of their musketry, their cool maneuvering under fire, effective coordination of combined arms operations and larger larger scale maneuvers, and a superb discipline produced by high morale and complete confidence in their commanders'. The French command & control system also had flexibilty enabling commanders to adapt & maneuver their forces to changing situations to acheive ultimate mission objectives (that is very similar to the German Army in the WWII in its Blitzkreig). The Russian and Austrian forces typically seemed to be locked and awaiting orders from above losing valuable time & few officers used their initiative. Having said that the Russian & Austrian forces fought hard and bravely and at times were able to throw the French back. In the end it was Napoleon's careful planning, use of detailed information about the enemy and the ability to acheive numerical superiority at a given point that led to his decisive victory.
A great addition to the history of the Napoleonic wars
This book is a good overview of the diplomatic and military defeats of the Third Coalition by Napoleon. It outlines the troubles between Austria and Prussia and how the Russians failed to react in time to Napoleons drive. Napoleon's generals were simply able to outperform all of the participants involved. The prose is directed and easy to read. You do not really need any prior knowledge of Napoleon to read this book and for those who are knowledgeable in Napoleon this book may drag on a little at times. Overall though it provides good information and is a worthwhile addition to any Napoleonic library.
This book is a good overview of the diplomatic and military defeats of the Third Coalition by Napoleon. It outlines the troubles between Austria and Prussia and how the Russians failed to react in time to Napoleons drive. Napoleon's generals were simply able to outperform all of the participants involved. The prose is directed and easy to read. You do not really need any prior knowledge of Napoleon to read this book and for those who are knowledgeable in Napoleon this book may drag on a little at times. Overall though it provides good information and is a worthwhile addition to any Napoleonic library.
What Napoleonic history ought to be! 
1805: Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Destruction of the Third Coalition By Robert Goetz Greenhill Books 2005 368 pages, 20 maps, 40 illustrations, 8 tables, 4 appendices ISBN 1-85367-644-6 The Battle of Austerlitz was perhaps the greatest of all Napoleon's victories, and seems to have been the battle he was most proud of. Compared, though, with the mountain of books about Waterloo and Trafalgar, it has been rather poorly served. There was a history by Christopher Duffy, which was good, but was rather small, and is somewhat dated now. There was also an Osprey by Ian Castle, which faces the usual limitations of the Osprey format, and a larger but flawed volume by Scott Bowden. Robert Goetz has now stepped forward to provide another account of this dramatic affair. He begins where every good historian should begin; in the beginning, with the collapse of the Peace of Amiens, and gives good coverage of the formation of the Third Coalition. He gives descriptions of the leaders on both sides, and of the armies that they led, and then moves up through the Capitulation of Ulm. This takes up the first chapter of the book. Two more chapters are dedicated to the development of the campaign prior to the great battle, including short descriptions of several of the minor actions, and the fall of Vienna. Three chapters cover the battle, and a fourth the Austro-Russian withdrawal from the field. Finally, a chapter follows the aftermath of the battle and the submission of the Holy Roman Emperor to the new Emperor of France. I've met Mr. Goetz on the internet, and I've been impressed by the depth of his knowledge and his evenhandedness towards the various sides in the early Napoleonic wars, so I was eagerly looking forward to this book. I was not disappointed! It is extensively researched and well written. The descriptions of the various movements and combats are clear, and (while the sources are not as transparently revealed in the text as Muir's recent Salamanca) the author usually shows us why he thinks certain things about the battle, and not others. The maps are a real help (unlike so many books these days!) especially the tactical maps, which are about the best maps I've seen. Above and beyond all this, the outstanding quality of this book is the author's willingness to see both good and the bad of both sides. He understands the deficiencies of the Allied armies, but doesn't make them out to be cowards or buffoons. Likewise, he sees the excellent qualities of the French army and its leaders, but without idolatry; they make mistakes and have problems too, and Mr. Goetz shows the bad with the good. The only defect worth mentioning is that the strategic maps are not quite as good as the tactical maps. My goalpost is that all places mentioned in the text will be on the maps, somewhere, and there are a few places not so mentioned; however, they are still well above the average of maps in history books these days. I was very pleased with this book and I unreservedly recommend it. It's intelligent, well researched, and well written. It's probably one of the two best Napoleonic history books published so far in this decade. Now, to get Mr. Goetz to write a book just as good on the 1807 Polish campaign! Yours, James D. Gray
1805: Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Destruction of the Third Coalition By Robert Goetz Greenhill Books 2005 368 pages, 20 maps, 40 illustrations, 8 tables, 4 appendices ISBN 1-85367-644-6 The Battle of Austerlitz was perhaps the greatest of all Napoleon's victories, and seems to have been the battle he was most proud of. Compared, though, with the mountain of books about Waterloo and Trafalgar, it has been rather poorly served. There was a history by Christopher Duffy, which was good, but was rather small, and is somewhat dated now. There was also an Osprey by Ian Castle, which faces the usual limitations of the Osprey format, and a larger but flawed volume by Scott Bowden. Robert Goetz has now stepped forward to provide another account of this dramatic affair. He begins where every good historian should begin; in the beginning, with the collapse of the Peace of Amiens, and gives good coverage of the formation of the Third Coalition. He gives descriptions of the leaders on both sides, and of the armies that they led, and then moves up through the Capitulation of Ulm. This takes up the first chapter of the book. Two more chapters are dedicated to the development of the campaign prior to the great battle, including short descriptions of several of the minor actions, and the fall of Vienna. Three chapters cover the battle, and a fourth the Austro-Russian withdrawal from the field. Finally, a chapter follows the aftermath of the battle and the submission of the Holy Roman Emperor to the new Emperor of France. I've met Mr. Goetz on the internet, and I've been impressed by the depth of his knowledge and his evenhandedness towards the various sides in the early Napoleonic wars, so I was eagerly looking forward to this book. I was not disappointed! It is extensively researched and well written. The descriptions of the various movements and combats are clear, and (while the sources are not as transparently revealed in the text as Muir's recent Salamanca) the author usually shows us why he thinks certain things about the battle, and not others. The maps are a real help (unlike so many books these days!) especially the tactical maps, which are about the best maps I've seen. Above and beyond all this, the outstanding quality of this book is the author's willingness to see both good and the bad of both sides. He understands the deficiencies of the Allied armies, but doesn't make them out to be cowards or buffoons. Likewise, he sees the excellent qualities of the French army and its leaders, but without idolatry; they make mistakes and have problems too, and Mr. Goetz shows the bad with the good. The only defect worth mentioning is that the strategic maps are not quite as good as the tactical maps. My goalpost is that all places mentioned in the text will be on the maps, somewhere, and there are a few places not so mentioned; however, they are still well above the average of maps in history books these days. I was very pleased with this book and I unreservedly recommend it. It's intelligent, well researched, and well written. It's probably one of the two best Napoleonic history books published so far in this decade. Now, to get Mr. Goetz to write a book just as good on the 1807 Polish campaign! Yours, James D. Gray
Not for Napoleon Fans … 
This is a book about how the Allies lost at Austerlitz, not about how Napoleon and the French won. Mr. Goetz does state in his intro that this will be construed as the »Allied version« of events and he wasn't kidding. We get blunder after blunder and the incompetency of command of the Allies in great detail, and the Allied details are great if you're into that sort of thing, but the French accounts are sparse. I wanted to learn how a great battle was won, not lost. I will be buying a different book on Austerlitz to get the taste of defeat which comes with this one out of my mouth.
This is a book about how the Allies lost at Austerlitz, not about how Napoleon and the French won. Mr. Goetz does state in his intro that this will be construed as the »Allied version« of events and he wasn't kidding. We get blunder after blunder and the incompetency of command of the Allies in great detail, and the Allied details are great if you're into that sort of thing, but the French accounts are sparse. I wanted to learn how a great battle was won, not lost. I will be buying a different book on Austerlitz to get the taste of defeat which comes with this one out of my mouth.
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